Vulnerability in WPA2

An air of unease set into the security circles on Sunday as they prepared for the disclosure of high-severity vulnerabilities in the Wi-Fi Protected Access II protocol that make it possible for attackers to eavesdrop Wi-Fi traffic passing between computers and access points.

The proof-of-concept exploit is called KRACK, short for Key Reinstallation Attacks. The research has been a closely guarded secret for weeks ahead of a coordinated disclosure that’s scheduled for 8am Monday, East Coast time. An advisory the US CERT recently distributed to about 100 organizations described the research this way:

US-CERT has become aware of several key management vulnerabilities in the 4-way handshake of the Wi-Fi Protected Access II (WPA2) security protocol. The impact of exploiting these vulnerabilities includes decryption, packet replay, TCP connection hijacking, HTTP content injection, and others. Note that as protocol-level issues, most or all correct implementations of the standard will be affected. The CERT/CC and the reporting researcher KU Leuven, will be publicly disclosing these vulnerabilities on 16 October 2017.


From Mikrotik:

On October 16. CERT/CC/ICASI released a public announcement about discovered vulnerabilities in WPA2 handshake protocols that affect most WiFi users and all vendors world wide.
RouterOS v6.39.3, v6.40.4, v6.41rc are not affected!
It is important to note that the vulnerability is discovered in the protocol itself, so even a correct implementation is affected.
These organizations did contact us earlier, so we have already released fixed versions that address the outlined issues. Not all of the discovered vulnerabilities directly impact RouterOS users, or even apply to RouterOS, but we did follow all recommendations and improved the key exchange process according to the guidelines we received from the organizations who discovered the issue.
We released fixed versions last week, so if you upgrade your devices routinely, no further action is required.


WPA is not encrypting your customer traffic

There was a Facebook discussion that popped up tonight about how a WISP answers the question “Is your network secure?” There were many good answers and the notion of WEP vs WPA was brought up.

In today’s society, you need end-to-end encryption for data to be secure. An ISP has no control over where the customer traffic is going. Thus, by default, the ISP has no control over customer traffic being secure.  “But Justin, I run WPA on all my aps and backhauls, so my network is secure.”  Again, think about end-to-end connectivity. Every one of your access points can be encrypted, and every one of your backhauls can be encrypted, but what happens when an attacker breaks into your wiring closet and installs a sniffer on a router or switch port?What most people forget is that WPA key encryption is only going on between the router/ap and the user device.  “But I lock down all my ports.” you say.  Okay, what about your upstream? Who is to say your upstream provider doesn’t have a port mirror running that dumps all your customer traffic somewhere.  “Okay, I will just run encrypted tunnels across my entire network!. Ha! let’s see you tear down that argument!”. Again, what happens when it leaves your network?  The encryption stops at the endpoint, which is the edge of your network.

Another thing everyone hears about is hotspots. Every so often the news runs a fear piece on unsecured hotspots.  This is the same concept.  If you connect to an unsecured hotspot, it is not much different than connecting to a hotspot where the WPA2 key is on a sign behind the cashier at the local coffee shop. The only difference is the “hacker” has an easier time grabbing any unsecured traffic you are sending. Notice I said unsecured.  If you are using SSL to connect to a bank site that session is sent over an encrypted session.  No sniffing going on there.  If you have an encrypted VPN the possibility of traffic being sniffed is next to none. I say next to none because certain types of VPNs are more secure than others. Does that mean the ISP providing the Internet to feed that hotspot is insecure? There is no feasible way for the ISP to provide end to end security of user traffic on the open Internet.

These arguments are why things like SSL and VPNs exist. Google Chrome is now expecting all websites to be SSL enabled to be marked as secure. VPNs can ensure end-to-end security, but only between two points.  Eventually, you will have to leave the safety and venture out into the wild west of the internet.  Things like Intranets exist so users can have access to information but still be protected. Even most of that is over encrypted SSL these days so someone can’t install a sniffer in the basement.

So what is a WISP supposed to say about security? The WISP is no more secure than any other ISP, nor are then any less secure.  The real security comes from the customer. Things like making sure their devices are up-to-date on security patches.  This includes the often forgotten router. Things like secure passwords, paying attention to browser warnings, e-mail awareness, and other things are where the real user security lies. VPN connections to work. Using SSL ports on e-mail. Using SSH and Secure RDP for network admins. Firewalls can help, but they don’t encrypt the traffic. Does all traffic need encrypted? no.

Everything you wanted to know about NTP

Network Time Protocol (NTP) is a service that can be used to synchronize time on network connected devices.   Before we dive into what NTP is, we need to understand why we need accurate time.

The obvious thing is network devices need an accurate clock.  Things like log files with the proper time stamp are important in troubleshooting.  Accurate timing also helps with security prevention measures.  Some attacks use vulnerabilities in time stamps to add in bad payloads or manipulate data. Some companies require accurate time stamps on files and transactions as well for compliance purposes.

So what are these Stratum levels I hear about?
NTP has several levels divided into stratum. All this is the distance from the reference clock source.  A clock which relays UTC (Coordinated Universal Time) that has little to no delay (we are talking nanoseconds) are Stratum-0 servers. These are not used on the network. These are usually atomic and GPS clocks.  A Stratum-0 server is connected to time servers or stratum-1 via GPS or a national time and frequency transmission.  A Stratum 1 device is a very accurate device and is not connected to a Stratum-0 clock over a network.  A Stratum-2 clock receives NTP packets from a Stratum-1 server, a Stratum-3 receives packets from a Stratum-2 server, and so on.  It’s all relative of where the NTP is in relationship to Stratum-1 servers.

Why are there levels?
The further you get away from Stratum-0 the more delay there is.  Things like jitter and network delays affect accuracy.  Most of us network engineers are concerned with milliseconds (ms) of latency.  Time servers are concerned with nanoseconds (ns). Even a server directly connected to a Stratum-0 reference will add 8-10 nanoseconds to UTC time.

My Mikrotik has an NTP server built in? Is that good enough?
This depends on what level of accuracy you want. Do you just need to make sure all of your routers have the same time? then synchronizing with an upstream time server is probably good enough. Having 5000 devices with the same time, AND not having to manually set them or keep them in sync manually is a huge deal.

Do you run a VOIP switch or need to be compliant when it comes to transactions on servers or need to be compliant with various things like Sox compliance you may need a more accurate time source.

What can I do for more accurate time?
Usually, a dedicated appliance is what many networks use.  These are purpose built hardware that receives a signal from GPS. the more accurate you need the time, the more expensive it will become.  Devices that need to be accurate to the nanosecond are usually more expensive than ones accurate to a microsecond.

If you google NTP Appliance you will get a bunch of results.  If you want to setp up from what you are doing currently you can look into these links:

How to Build a Stratum 1 NTP Server Using A Raspberry Pi


Building a Stratum 1 NTP Server with a Raspberry Pi


Homeland Security US-Cert e-mail on Network infrastructure

A few days ago Homeland Security published an e-mail on threats to network devices and securing them.  Rather than cut and paste I exported the e-mail to a PDF. Some good best practices in here.

TA16250A The Increasing Threat to Network Infrastructure Devices and Recommended Mitigations

Calea and the ISP

The Communications and Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) passed in 1994 is a piece of legislation every U.S. ISP should know about and be in compliance with.  If for the simple fact the government can levy heavy fines if you aren’t compliant.

For those of you wanting some background please follow these links:

First of all CALEA isn’t simply sticking wireshark onto your network and sending a packet dump to a law enforcement agency. It is much more complicated than that. You have several things which the CALEA standard addresses.

1.The ability to send multiple streams, in real time, to different law enforcement agencies.
2.The ability to not interrupt the connection to a person of interest.  In other words you don’t want to interrupt their connection to insert a piece of hardware.
3.The ability to provide just the information on the warrant.  Too much information can actually violate the court order.
4.There is a difference between a typical “request for information” warrant and a CALEA request.  These are not the same.  CALEA almost always comes from a federal agency. They are expecting you to be compliant with CALEA.

Now, here is where things get a little subjective.  The FBI has which is linked from the above web-site.  The askcalea web-site has not been updated since 2011.  The service provider login and service provider registration simply does not work. The information about CALEA is pretty outdated.

So what does this mean for you as a small ISP? Stay tuned for more information.

SHA-1 Certificates EOL

The SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm has been known to be considerably weaker than it was designed to besince at least 2005 — 9 years ago. Collision attacks against SHA-1 are too affordable for us to consider it safe for the public web PKI. We can only expect that attacks will get cheaper.

That’s why Chrome will start the process of sunsetting SHA-1 (as used in certificate signatures for HTTPS) with Chrome 39 in November. HTTPS sites whose certificate chains use SHA-1 and are valid past 1 January 2017 will no longer appear to be fully trustworthy in Chrome’s user interface.